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Introduction: 
 
 
 Approaches to European Foreign Policy Making 
The Commission of the European Communities published a first policy paper1 "Towards a New Asia 
Strategy," in July 1994.  The paper has since been approved by the Council in principle.2  It is aimed at 
"strengthening the European economic presence in Asia in cooperation with the member states and the 
private sector but it also suggests "subjects for political discussion." 
 
The publication of this paper is to be seen in the context of at least three important developments.  First, 
the rapid economic growth in Asia, termed "miracle" in a recent World Bank Report3; second the 
general mood that Europe is missing out on this "boom," being surpassed by Japan and the U.S. as 
major influences in the region; and third the ratification of the Treaty of European Union (TEU) with 
its new potential for the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
  
 
Under these conditions, the European Commission threw its hat in the ring by proposing a "New Asia 
Strategy."  The proposal was published on July 13, just two weeks before the Post-Ministerial 
Conferences (PMC), the meeting of ASEAN ministers with their dialogue partners, in Bangkok on July 
26.  This paper is aimed at evaluating the Commission's strategy and its prospects for implementation 
by taking a look at the institutions and decision making procedures at hand to carry out this policy. 
 
Foreign policy actions of the European Union, and before the European Community, so far have been 
somewhat of a puzzle and now certainly warrant further scholarly attention to include the changes 
brought about by the Maastricht Treaty.  Ginsberg4, in his very comprehensive study of EC foreign 
policy actions between 1958 and 1985, in addition to demonstrating the mere existence of EC foreign 
policy actions as well as their increase in number over time, is mostly concerned with the question 
what caused or triggered these actions.  He suggests to distinguish between actions related to "internal" 
European integration, "external" global interdependence, and "self-styled" actions.  The new Asia 
strategy, which is a whole policy package rather than a single action5, probably falls into the "self-
styled" category as an attempt by the European Union to assert itself in the Asia-Pacific region, 
combined with some elements drawing on the progress of internal integration (ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty) and the impact of some global interdependence factors (the economic emergence of 
Asia and its impact on the respective trading partners; the EU "competing" with the U.S. and Japan in 
Asia). 
 However, the main questions for this paper here does not evolve around the causes of and triggers for a 
new Asia strategy.  The paper is rather aimed at evaluating the prospects for implementing a 
"common" European Asia strategy and the role the most important institutions, namely the 
Commission and the Council will assume in implementing  this process.  That is to say that, having 
established the EU as a foreign policy actor, we want to see how these policies fare--just like in the 
analysis of other "common" (internal) policies. 
 
The success or influence of Europe in Asia very much rests on the assumption of a "common" 
European approach.  Given the strong influence of the U.S and Japan, as outlined briefly below, 
probably none of the individual member states can build up a equally significant presence in the Asia-
Pacific region alone.  All member states in one way or the other benefit from an "economy of scale" 
rather than   
struggling for their luck on their own in this arena. 
 
Interestingly enough the Europe's feared competitors, Japan and the U.S., are blamed to "lack a 
comprehensive strategy in regard to relations with Southeast Asia"6  However, their respective 
influences are undisputed and they have a shared interest in sustained economic growth and political 
stability in Asia and Southeast Asia in particular.  Japan, on the one hand, has taken on the role of the 
"banker," providing foreign direct investment and increasingly exporting its manufacturing sites to 
countries with labour cost advantages; the U.S., on the other hand, has provided a security umbrella but 
is now in the process of shifting its emphasis to trade after the end of the cold war.  The U.S. is the 
largest export market for many Asian countries.  Through the APEC initiative, the U.S. has recently 
again manifested its strong interest in the Asia Pacific region. 
 
This is the background against which a common European approach is to develop.  An effective 
common approach of the Community and the EU has often been associated with supranational 
characteristics: strong community   
institutions, a body of European law superseding national law, majority voting in the Council rather 
than unanimous decision making.  Foreign policy making in the EC however, the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) in particular, has mostly been characterized by intergovernmental procedures.  In 
spite of these strong intergovernmental features, the Commission, as a (supranational?) institution 
which represents "Community" interests, has kept a hand in the foreign policy arena7. 
 
This paper argues that the new Asia strategy, under the umbrella of the Maastricht Treaty with its new 
provisions for a common foreign policy, is yet another push of the Commission towards a "common" 
European approach.  For the foreign policy arena and in this Asian case in particular, the Commission 
is not only demonstrating its right to propose policy but also claiming some aspects of implementation, 
although the Commission's means are limited compared with those of the member states. 
 
Given the novelty of the Asia strategy, what follows is a very preliminary collection of observations, 
which I hope to develop further into a contribution to both the understanding of Asian-European 
relations and the underlying   
institutional conditions for the making of European foreign policy.  Beyond the debate of supranational 
vs. intergovernmental, an analysis of how the European institutions work might shed some light on the 
prospects for Europe as a collective actor on the foreign policy stage. 
 
The remainder of the paper is divided into three parts, namely, first, an review of the policies proposed; 
second an exploration into the institutions charged with its implementation; and third, by way of 
conclusion, a shaky hypothesis for the prospects of Europe's "New Asia Strategy" will be constructed. 
 
 
The New Asia Strategy 
Turning to the first part, a review of the policies proposed: It is to be noted that the "New Asia 
Strategy" covers all of Asia, except the five Central Asian Republics which are dealt with in the 
context of CIS; the Commission then proposes in fact a strategy for 26 very diverse countries, including the ten countries of Southeast Asia8, the eight countries of East Asia9 and the eight countries 
of South Asia10.  Economic growth in these countries has been   
very rapid, as evident in the average GNP growth of 44% for Asia from 1990 until 1995, compared 
with only 16% in Latin America for the same period, 11% in Africa and -32% in Eastern Europe and 
CIS11.  As the Commission paper notes: "Not the least significant aspect of the ongoing Asian 
transformation is that it represents the first achievement of sustained economic growth by a major area 
of the world outside of Europe or regions of European settlement."12 
 
According to 1993 figures, the EU is the second largest market for Asian exports after the U.S., 
absorbing a share of about 27%; European exports to Asia have increased from 7% in 1980 to 20% in 
1993. However, the Commission paper points out that "The growth of intra-Asian trade has led to a 
decline in dependence upon developed country markets in North American and Europe to a degree 
never before seen."13 
 
Most worrisome is the result for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Asia, which shows only a 10 % 
share from the EU; EU investment in Asia was in fact declining between 1986 and 1992.14 
  
 
The Commission paper reviews the existing policy instruments, namely trade and cooperation 
agreements, bilateral political dialogue as well as the dialogue with ASEAN.  Given the limitation of 
the European Communities before the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty to mostly economic matters, 
the policy towards Asia concentrated on trade liberalization, trade promotion and development aid.  
Recently, economic cooperation has been emphasized over mere poverty alleviation projects, including 
concessions granted under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and investment projects for 
non-member countries coordinated by the European Investment Bank (EIB). 
 
So far the "old" European strategy towards Asia.  The "new" strategy, after Maastricht, is twofold as it 
emphasizes both political and economic aspects.  As far as the political side is concerned, which is a 
relatively new chapter altogether, the Commission describes Europe's stand in the following way: 
 
  In the aftermath of World War II, Europe's former Asian colonies gained their independence 
leading to the almost complete withdrawal of European forces from the region.  Hongkong and Macau 
will revert to China in 1997 and 1999, respectively.  As a result, the European influence on 
developments in Asia has for many years been exerted mainly through the medium of trade and 
investment, as well as development co-operation and cultural exchanges.  It is to be noted, however, 
that some Member States still have wider interests in the region and maintain relationships that include 
a security component..."15 
  
 
The recommendation of the paper, then, is to acknowledge Asia's increasing importance on the global 
stage and focus the political dialogue on three topics, namely the growing military expenditure in East 
Asia (and consequently on arms control and non-proliferation), on human rights issues and on policies 
to combat drugs.  The fora suggested for these discussions include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
as well as new "topical" troika meetings with the partners which would focus on one specific issue in 
particular. 
 
For the economic side, the paper stipulates that "the EU's existing relations [with Asia]... must be 
adapted to reflect the fact that we are all now partners in a global economy"16.  Focal points include 
"market opening" by lobbying for standards and quality control, observance of intellectual property 
rights and the mutual recognition of agreements.  The Commission identifies banking, energy, 
environmental technology, transport equipment and telecommunications as priority sectors for 
economic cooperation; it is also intend on integrating China, India, Vietnam and Pakistan as emerging 
market economies. 
 Attention should be drawn to two points on this economic side of the new Asia program in particular: 
The Commission marks a strong commitment to "raising Europe's profile in Asia" via educational 
programs; it also wants to promote business cooperation by establishing European Business   
Information Centres (EBICs). 
 
So what is new about this "New Strategy towards Asia?"  I would argue, first, that the innovation 
mainly lies in the mere fact that European attention is drawn and paid to Asia; second in the fact that 
the Commission ventures in to the new area of security and foreign policy action; and third, and most 
important: that a common approach, spearheaded by the Commission for all the member states of the 
European Union is suggested.  Both these assertions "common approach" and "spearheaded by the 
Commission" carry heavy question marks. 
 
 
 
Implementing the New Asia Strategy 
After this brief review of the New Asia Policy, let me turn to the second part, the question of the EU's 
institutional capacity to implement this new common approach towards Asia.  As suggested in the 
introduction, an effective "common" approach is often associated with strong supranational elements, 
such as a determined European Commission to push this policy versus and, if necessary, against the 
member states.  I therefore want to point out some of the European elements at hand to carry out the 
policy but also point to some reactions from the member states as well.  Certainly, by putting forth a 
strong proposal, the Commission had already made a first and important "supranational" step towards a 
common Asia policy; what, then, are the prospects for carrying it further? 
 
I want to approach this question in two parts, first with respect to the implementation of the political 
dialogue, second with respect to the economic measures suggested.  However, both political and 
economic approaches are related. 
 
 
Observation No. 1:  Institutions in the Foreign Policy Process--or the Commission is Gaining Ground 
 
For the political part: One of the more interesting passages of the Commission document actually 
appears under the headline "Characteristics of the new Political Approach towards Asia." The 
Commission there states: 
 
  The political dialogue must gain its legitimacy from the Council and from the European 
Parliament with the Commission playing the special role conferred upon it.17 
 
The paper of the Commission admits that, via the Council, different historic relations between member 
states and the region will be reflected as well as the various present interests of these same member 
states to strengthen the their respective relationships with the region. 
 
What in fact are the powers and the roles "conferred upon" these three players, the Commission, the 
Council and the European Parliament by the TEU for external relations? 
 
The Maastricht Treaty18 brought some improvement in the role of the Commission in external 
political matters over the existing arrangements for the European Political Cooperation (EPC), as 
specified in the Single European Act (SEA).  The   
Commission received the right to initiate policies, although it is not the exclusive right of initiation the 
Commission enjoys for other matters of the European Community. 
 
In response to this increased role in the external political matters, the Commission, in addition to the 
existing Directorate General for External Economic Relations, installed D.G. Ia for External Political 
Relations and created a respective portfolio for a commissioner.  In the new Commission, both 
president Jacques Santer and the former Dutch foreign minister Hans van den Broek share the 
responsibility for the Common foreign and security policy.  As detailed below, responsibilities for external economic relations are shared among even more commissioners, so that altogether 5 out of 20 
have a say in external matters. 
 
However, the main responsibility for developing the CFSP clearly rests with the Council:  The 
European Council is given a formal role in defining principles and general guidelines of the policy.  
The General Council, composed of the Foreign Ministers of the member states, acts as main decision 
making body.  It can both issue common positions as well as decide on joint actions, theoretically even 
on the basis of qualified majority voting19.  The rotating Council presidency is given special 
responsibility for representing the Union in foreign policy matters and for the implementation of 
common measures.  To ensure a smooth   
transition between the six months' rounds of duty among the member states, the former, present and 
future president often work closely together and even appear together in meetings in the so-called 
"troika" formation. 
 
The work of the Council in external political relations, just as it has become customary in other areas, 
is supported and prepared by a host of committees, including COREPER, the political committee, the 
correspondents' group, a number of working groups and the general secretariat.  The political 
committee, composed of the political directors from the foreign ministries of the member states, and 
with the Director General of D.G. Ia represented, is the most important of the preparatory committees. 
 
The European Parliament has been up-graded in foreign policy matters and now enjoys the right to be 
consulted and to receive information from the Council in this area.  Also, its assent is required when it 
comes the concluding agreements between the EU and foreign countries. 
 
This institutional lay out assigned by the Maastricht Treaty clearly gives the Council and the member 
states the leading role plus, in the form of committees, a big entourage on the foreign policy stage, 
while the Commission with its non-exclusive right to initiate policies is little more than a supporting 
actor and the European Parliament relegated to   
the status of the chorus, allowed to observe and comment but not to take action by itself. 
 
However, the competency of the Commission has increased in foreign policy matters with the right to 
take initiative and the Commission has made internal adjustments to cope with this area. 
 
As for the representation of these foreign policy interests abroad, the EU has more than 100 
delegations around the world which are technically delegations of the Commission.  They are led by 
the "Head of Delegation" with the title and--theoretically--rank of ambassador.  In the region of 26 
Asian countries under consideration here, the Commission has 10 offices and representations at the 
moment.20  The delegation in Japan, established in 1974, is the oldest in the region, followed by the 
delegation in Bangkok, Thailand, operating since 1978.  Some new delegations in the region, like in 
Vietnam, are in the process of being opened. 
 
The delegation in Bangkok, for example, serves altogether six countries, Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, 
Vietnam, and Myanmar in addition to Thailand itself.  Needless to say, that all member states, except 
for Luxembourg, have substantial and well-equipped embassies or representations in Bangkok, which 
mostly take care of Thailand only.  In comparison, the staff at the delegation of the European   
Commission is limited to mostly development experts who stretch themselves and their resources to 
cover six countries, among them dynamic places like Vietnam and Cambodia where dramatic political 
and economic changes are underway. 
 
Abroad as at home the Commission seems besieged by the forces of the member states surrounding it--
but it is worth noting that its network of delegations in Asia has expanded from zero to ten over the 
course of only twenty years and that new delegations are being established.  However, coordination 
efforts by the delegations of the Commission among the diplomatic corps of the member states abroad 
certainly involve high transaction costs.  The embassies of the member states want to deter any 
development of the Delegation into a European "super-embassy."  At times it seems that the head of delegation of the European Commission cannot even make a public appearance without the 
ambassador from the respective country holding the presidency following closely on his heals. 
 
By way of conclusion: the Commission's human resources and decision making capacities to be 
applied to EU external relations both in Brussels and abroad are limited but the Commission is trying 
hard to gain ground and expand. 
 
Observation No. 2:  The Budget for External Action--Little Money for Big Plans 
  
 
After this discussions of the institutions involved both in Brussels and abroad, it is also useful to take a 
brief look at the budgetary appropriation available for "European" external action.  This will confirm 
our impression that the Commission, in spite of its declared determination to play a role in external 
relations has limited means at hand indeed. 
 
We know that the budget of the Union overall represents only a small fraction of the resources of the 
member states--the 1993 budget of about 65 billion ECU amounted to 1.11% of the member states' 
combined GNP.21  It is an equally well known fact that the lion's share of this budget is spent on the 
Common Agricultural Policy--for 1993 this share amounted to about 54%.  Only 4.2% of the EU 
budget was spent on external action.  From this share appropriated for "external action," again the bulk 
of more than one third went to "Cooperation with Central and East European Countries and the 
Independent States of the former Soviet Union;" only about 15 percent, less than half of the 
appropriation for Eastern Europe, was spent on, cooperation with Latin American and Asian 
developing countries together. 
 
The budget for 1995 however, which was passed by the European Parliament on December 15, 1994, 
shows some   
increases for external action22.  It includes a new line item for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy in the amount of 80 million ECU or 0.1% of the total budget of about 77 billion ECU.  The 
appropriations for cooperation with developing countries and other third countries seemed to have 
risen in comparison with the 1993 budget to 5.4%. 
 
As limited as these resources may seem, the Commission is able to fund some projects of potential 
strategic importance, like the establishment of European Business Information Centers (discussed 
below) and other educational programs which support the mission of the Commission and might 
ultimately lend support to a "common" European approach abroad. 
 
 
Observation No. 3:  The Commission and Member States in Diplomatic Action--not Necessarily 
United and Member States always First 
 
We have seen so far that the Commission is making the most of its still limited foreign policy role, by 
taking advantage of its right to propose, by opening new delegations, by financing strategic projects 
out of a limited budget for external actions, while the member states watch closely over every step.  
This is especially apparent when it comes to representing the EU in multilateral meetings.  An analysis 
of both the Commission as well as the Council's stance in such meetings further contributes to our 
understanding of the possibilities of a "common" European approach.  The most recent ASEAN PMC 
meeting, held right after the publication of the Commission's Asia strategy paper during the German 
presidency serves as a specific example after a brief review of the overall framework of EU-ASEAN 
relations23. 
 
  
The fora recommended in the Commission paper for the political dialogue with Asian countries are 
meetings in the context of ASEAN and of the new ASEAN Regional Forum, which was inaugurated in 
July 1994 in Bangkok.  ASEAN so far includes the six countries Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, 
Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia with Vietnam applying for membership and Laos and Cambodia considering it;  the new ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), in addition to the ASEAN countries, brings 
representatives from the U.S., the EU, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Korea, Russia, 
China and Vietnam to the roundtable of discussions. 
 
Since the British entry into the EC in 1973, relations with ASEAN (which goes back to the Bangkok 
Declaration of 1967 with five original member states and Brunei joining in 1984) have been fostered, 
among other reasons, as an entree for Europe into the Asia Pacific region.  They also provided an 
opportunity for the EC to promote the idea of regional integration in an arena other than Europe 
itself.24  The relationship was formalized with the cooperation agreement of 1980, including 
declarations on political and economic issues. 
 
Foreign Ministers of both regional groupings have met since 1978 in intervals of about 18 months 
within the framework of   
the EC-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting or EAMM.  The most recent of these meetings, number eleven 
altogether, took place in September 1994 in Karlsruhe, Germany.  The Commission is also represented 
at these meetings.  The EAMM in Karlsruhe was followed by a first EU-ASEAN Business Conference 
in Stuttgart. 
 
The other important forum for discussion among the two regional groupings are the Post-Ministerial 
Conferences (PMC) in the context of the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meetings.  At these so-called 
"6+7" meetings, the ministers from the six ASEAN countries meet with their colleagues from their 
"dialogue partners," namely from the EU, the U.S., Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South 
Korea.  The 27th ASEAN PMC took place in Bangkok in July 1994.  It was on the eve of this meeting 
that the ARF was inaugurated.  The EU is usually represented by the troika of ministers from the past, 
present and future member state holding the presidency of the Council as well as by a commissioner 
for external affairs.  It is to be noted that the EU's dialogue partners not always understand that a 
European troika would involve actually four representatives (three from the member states plus one 
from the Commission) and that the Commission at times had to stand up for its right to attend a 
meeting. 
 
The most recent ASEAN PMC in Bangkok fell within the Germany presidency, hence the German 
foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel,   
delivered an introductory statement.  The Commission was represented by Hans van den Broek, who 
then--during the last half year of the Delors Commission--held the portfolio for external political 
relations, the Common foreign and security policy as well as for enlargement negotiations. 
 
The two opening statements of the representative of the Council and the Commission25 showed a clear 
division of labor: van den Broek, although endowed with the portfolio of external political relations, 
was clearly relegated to stay within the realm of economic matters while Minister Kinkel elaborated on 
political issues.  He put the very sensitive human rights issues in Myanmar and Cambodia first and 
then continued to outline at length the political responsibilities of the German presidency ranging from 
ensuring security and stability in Europe to EU enlargement by EFTA countries to the problems in 
Eastern Europe, Russia and the former Yugoslavia.  
 
The commissioner, in a shorter speech, drew attention to the Asia strategy paper and the need for a 
coordinated EU   
presence in Asia, he mentioned the need to increase the political dialogue with Asia, the ARF, 
ASEAN's enlargement and EU relations of Vietnam.  He also gave considerable space to the 
relationship of EU and ASEAN within the context of the new World Trade Organization. 
 
Since both the Minister and the commissioner mentioned Cambodia, the respective passages in their 
speeches are good examples for the difference in approach: 
 
  Klaus Kinkel: In an impressive move in the face of massive intimidation attempts by the Khmers 
Rouges, one of the signatories to the Paris agreement, the people of Cambodia placed responsibility for 
the nation's affairs in the hands of a democratically legitimized government.  The government has quickly addressed itself to its difficult tasks. But the process of reconstruction is being jeopardized by 
the Khmers Rouges.  The EU will continue to give Cambodia substantial reconstruction assistance.  
Cambodia's neighbours are particularly called upon to support the country.  A peaceful Cambodia must 
be at the core of our joint endeavours in keeping with the spirit of the Paris accords. 
 
  Hans van den Broek: Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to note that the EU is taking its full 
responsibility and its full share in working for the rehabilitation of Cambodia.  This commitment is 
reflected in our financial contribution. 
 
This example from the political arena shows that the representative from the Council is clearly the 
dominating figure who can use his moment on the stage not only to promote the EU but also to 
emphasize the contributions from the member state he is representing.  The Commission is reduced to 
economic topics.  However, this conclusion   
probably should be tested under different conditions, with another member state holding the presidency.  
Given Germany's emerging new role in global politics, Kinkel was bound to take a stronger stance, 
than, for example a representative from Luxembourg or the Netherlands probably would have taken. 
 
One final point aside with respect to the Bangkok PMC:  The Commission's statement seems the more 
appropriate for the occasion.  The way the Cambodian problem was treated, for example, showed 
respect and consideration for the Asian hosts who have made it clear on a number of occasions that 
"Asian values" differ--especially when it comes to human rights--and that they prefer to treat these 
problems their way.26  
 
For the political side, then, we can conclude that the Commission takes full advantage of its right to 
propose policies and that it is also trying to adjust its human resources both in the headquarters in 
Brussels as well as in the overseas delegations to take on the new tasks in the foreign policy area.  
However, the example of the high level meeting with the Asian and other partners show that the 
Commission is not given much room for maneuver and is clearly overplayed by the member states, in 
this case the   
representative of the country holding the presidency.  
 
This might affect the capacity to bring a about a "common" European approach as the respective 
representative from the Council does not have many constraints which keep him or her from promoting 
the position of his own member state.  To put it more bluntly: What keeps Minister Kinkel from being 
German rather than European in Bangkok?  Which constraints would keep any given member state 
from using the European stage for their own purposes?  These questions can serve as basis for further 
research as the new Asia strategy is put to work and the CFSP in general develops. 
 
If these are the results for the political side, how does it look, then for the economic side27? 
 
Observation No. 4:  Many Cooks Among the Commissioners for External Economic Relations 
 
For the economics side, the strategy paper of the Commission demanded policies of "market opening" 
and identified some sectors, like environmental technology, transport equipment and 
telecommunications for economic cooperation.  The establishment of European Business Information 
Centres   
(EBIC) are also recommended.  The paper urges the cooperation between the Union and its member 
states and encourages the participation of the European private sector.  What are the prospects of 
having the Commission's policy proposals implemented? 
 
Again, the same budget constraints and limits of human resources apply, which were pointed out above 
for the Commission's activities in the new area of CFSP.  The responsibilities for external relations are 
scattered indeed among the commissioners:  In the new Santer Commission, the president himself 
takes care of the CFSP and human rights; Vice-President Sir Leon Brittan is assigned to North 
America and some Asian countries including China, among other regions; Vice-President Manuel 
Marin takes care of the Southern Mediterranean countries, the Middle East, Latin America and the rest of Asia; Hans van den Broek is in charge of relations with Eastern Europe and shares some 
responsibilities for the CFSC with the president of the Commission; Joao Pinheiro is assigned to Africa 
and the Caribbean and Pacific countries.  That makes five commissioners out of 20 with 
responsibilities for external affairs or 25 percent of the man power for an area where only about five 
percent of the EU's budget is spent.28  (Four of the five, for example, were present at the 1806th 
meeting of the General Affairs Council in Brussels on November 28 1994, only Commissioner 
Pinheiro was missing). 
 
If the Commission were the cabinet of an executive government, this would amount to having five 
ministers of foreign affairs, one for each continent or world region assigned to him.  It is noteworthy 
that the area under consideration in the strategy paper of the Commission is shared by two 
commissioners, namely Sir Leon Brittan, who is responsible for Japan, China, Korea, Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan, while Manuel Marin is responsible for the remaining Asian countries covered by 
the strategy paper. 
 
 
These commissioners with portfolios for external relations split the Directorate General I (with about 
eleven directorates) and Ia among them.  This split of external responsibilities among commissioners 
might lead to the conclusion that a "common approach" is difficult to find even within the Commission 
itself; however, given the fact that the Commission has to decide jointly, as a collegiate body anyway, 
we cannot make a strong case for "lack of coherence" based on this evidence.  As far as the Asia policy 
is concerned, let us just conclude that two commissioners responsible for an area which is as diverse as 
the 26 Asian countries under consideration cannot hurt as   
long as the cooperation between these commissioners works. 
 
 
Observation No. 5: European Community Business Associations--or the Commission's Attempt to 
Unite European Business Interests Abroad 
 
Given the limits of the Commission's institutional capacity in implementing policy in general and the 
specific constraints in the foreign policy area outlined above, the Commission has taken to contracting 
out development projects funded from the EU budget, or, as in the context of the New Asia Policy, 
projects to promote "Europe" in Asia.  One such attempt is the establishment of European 
Communities Business Associations and related European Business Information Centers (EBIC), 
which are underway, for example, in Manila, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore29. 
 
The institutional structure of the EBICs is such that the Commission will coordinate and finance the 
office for the first five years, including the position of an executive director.  The EBICs is governed 
by a board of representatives from the member states and an executive committee consisting of the 
directors of the bilateral chambers of commerce of the member states (or other representatives from the 
member states).  The executive committee includes a member of the Commission. 
  
 
Hence, the coordinating and decision making dilemmas familiar from other EU institutions have been 
exported here, maybe for the first time, to a) an expatriate setting and b) the business community or at 
least the chambers of commerce representing the business community.  The very tasks of EBICs are 
yet to be defined as the member states and the Commission develop different expectations towards 
them.  EBICs should provide information on market access for the Asian and European businesses, 
respectively.  The Asian side in particular is hoping for easy access to information on EU regulations.  
In addition, the Commission very much puts the emphasis on an aggressive approach of promoting 
European business in Asia in order to develop a firm stance against the "competitors," Japan and the 
U.S. 
 
Yet another function is the coordination between the existing bilateral chambers of commerce, in 
charge of promoting business relations between, e.g. Germany or France and the respective Asian country.  As with other EU institutions, it remains to be seen how strong these EBICs will be allowed 
to develop with respect to, for example, a very powerful German business presence in the respective 
Asian country and to what extend the Commission will be allowed to play its envisaged role.  This 
leads to the bigger question of how effective EBICs will be in promoting Europe in Asia over Japan 
and the U.S.30 
 
As with the opening of new delegations, the Commission here again has created a potential instrument 
to push for a "common" European approach abroad. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In view of the U.S. and Japanese influence over Southeast Asia, the European partners feel 
underrepresented and now, with the dynamic economic development of the region, fear missing out on 
the "boom."  This trend might be reversed by developing a strong, coherent and common European 
approach.  The European Commission has accordingly proposed a "New Asia Strategy," which was in 
principle accepted by the member states. 
 
The implementation of this strategy very much rests on the Commission's stance vs. the interests of the 
member states.  We have seen that the in realm of external relations in particular, the Commission has 
made slow but steady inroads to preserve and expand its role as a player: With the Maastricht Treaty, it 
received the right to put forth proposals in this area also, it has build up and is expanding a network of 
delegations abroad and is in the   
process of creating new institutions, like the European Community Business Associations, to defend 
European interests. 
 
However, this progress of the Commission in the foreign policy arena notwithstanding, it is the 
Council and the representatives of the member states, and the country holding the presidency in 
particular, which decide on and set the tone in foreign relations.  This leaves the "common" European 
approach in danger of being ultimately reduced to the approach of one member state, namely of the 
member state holding the presidency only.  For the joint representation of European interest in Asia 
this could mean that the Commission's efforts are, if not already too late, too little. 
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